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STRIKE VIOLENCE: THE NLRB'S RELUCTANCE TO
WIELD ITS BROAD REMEDIAL POWER
"This is Union Nacional and we kill people. So leave."
INTRODUCTION
In the early days of the American labor movement, numerous
bloody confrontations between labor and management marred the
workers' struggle for higher wages, shorter hours and safer working
conditions.' The passage of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA
or Act) 2 in 1935 manifested the federal government's concern for labor
peace and the concomitant reduction of industrial strife.3 The origi-
nal Act, popularly known as the Wagner Act,4 placed restrictions on
employers' efforts to resist union attempts to organize employees;
unions were, however, as yet unrestricted in their exertion of pressure
* Union Nacional de Trabajadores (Catalytic Indus. Maintenance Co.), 219
N.L.R.B. 414, 417 (1975) (Member Kennedy, dissenting in part) (proclamation of
union president Arturo Grant to an employee seeking to cross a picket line), enforced,
540 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
1. Labor history is replete with instances of violence and its resultant death and
destruction. During the Great Upheaval of 1877, federal and state militias dispersed
mobs of striking railroad workers, wounding and killing many, with fire damage to
the Pennsylvania Railroad resulting in losses exceeding $5 million. T. Brooks, Toil
and Trouble: A History of American Labor 50-54 (rev. 2d ed. 1971). During the
Haymarket Square Riot of 1886, a bomb exploded amidst a crowd of workers and
police, killing 7 and wounding 59. Police gunfire accounted for several deaths and
200 injuries. Id. at 68-70. In the Homestead Strike of 1892, at least 10 persons were
killed and scores wounded in a clash between steelworkers and Pinkerton detectives
hired by the Carnegie Steel Corp. Id. at 86-92; H. Pelling, American Labor 97-98
(1960). The dynamiting of the Los Angeles Times building in 1910 by the McNamara
brothers, leaders of the Ironworkers Union, destroyed the entire building and left 20
persons dead. G. Adams, Age of Industrial Violence 1910-15: The Activities and
Findings of the United States Commission on Industrial Relations 1, 7-17 (1966); T.
Brooks, supra, at 111-12; H. Pelling, supra, at 108-09. During the Ludlow Massacre
of 1914, a miners' tent colony was set afire, killing women and children. An exchange
of gunfire between the miners and state militiamen left several dead. G. Adams,
supra, at 156-61; T. Brooks, supra, at 128-30. At the Memorial Day Massacre of
1937, an unprovoked volley of police gunfire upon striking steelworkers killed 10 and
wounded 30. Another 28 were beaten. Id. at 190-91.
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976). The original version of the Act is contained in
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
3. 79 Cong. Rec. 2371-72 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner); id. at 6183-84
(address by Sen. Wagner); A. Fried, Except to Walk Free: Documents and Notes in
the History of American Labor 216 (1974); see S. Cohen, Labor in the United States
81-82, 361 (4th ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as S. Cohen I]; C. Gregory & H. Katz,
Labor and the Law 224, 230 (3d ed. 1979).
4. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§
141-187 (1976)).
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in organizational campaigns. 5  The balance of power in the labor-
management structure was altered by the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act0
which amended the NLRA by imposing restrictions upon unions.7
These included a prohibition against the use of violence by unions to
coerce or interfere with the rights of employees.8
Although no clashes on the scale of earlier confrontations have
taken place in recent years, violence occurs in many modern-day
strikes and picket-line situations. 9 Labor violence victimizes employ-
ers, 10 employees" and innocent third parties,12 and can result in
5. S. Cohen I, supra note 3, at 81-82; C. Gregory & H. Katz, supra note 3, at
224; see 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1976).
6. Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§
141-187 (1976)).
7. S. Cohen I, supra note 3, at 381-82; A. Fried, supra note 3, at 264; C.
Gregory & H. Katz, supra note 3, at 342-43; see 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1976).
8. C. Gregory & H. Katz, supra note 3, at 360-61; see 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A)
(1976).
9. In District 1199, Nat'l Union of Hosp. & Health Care Employees, 245
N.L.R.B. 800 (1979), picketers had bombarded vehicles carrying nursing home
employees with rocks, cans and bottles. The vehicles were dented, windows were
broken and several passengers were injured by shattered glass. Id. at 802-03. In Hotel
& Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Union, Local 2, 240 N.LR.B. 757 (1979),
picketers had entered Zim's Restaurant, assaulted the assistant manager and created
a disturbance in the kitchen area. Id. at 773-74. In Maywood Plant of Grede Plastics,
235 N.L.R.B. 363 (1978), modified on other grounds, 628 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1980),
employees seeking to enter the plant had been shoved and threatened by picketers,
and the personnel manager was grabbed around the neck and similarly threatened.
One employee was pushed into her car, sustaining an injury; several other employees
were forcibly removed from their vehicles, and car windows were smashed. Id. at
367-68. In Local 248, Meat & Allied Food Workers, 222 N.L.R.B. 1023 (1976),
enforced mem., 84 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 10,826 (7th Cir. 1978), picketers had threat-
ened employees and supervisors with bodily harm and property damage. Employees
were assaulted and injured, and cars attempting to cross the picket line were dam-
aged by picketers who scratched, dented, and hit the cars with picket signs and other
objects. Id. at 1026-34. In Scott v. Moore, 640 F.2d 708, reh'g en banc granted, 656
F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1981), a mob of union supporters had savagely attacked a
nonunion employer and his employees with iron rods and wooden boards. The
construction site office was set on fire, and cars, trucks and company equipment were
vandalized. Id. at 712.
10. E.g., Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Union, Local 2, 240
N.L.R.B. 757, 773-74 (1979); Maywood Plant of Grede Plastics, 235 N.L.R.B. 363,
367 (1978) (Member Murphy, dissenting in part), modified on other grounds, 628
F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Union Nacional de Trabajadores (Jacobs Constructors Co.),
219 N.L.R.B. 405, 409 (1975), enforced, 540 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1039 (1977).
11. E.g., UAW, Local 552, 239 N.L.R.B. 312, 314 (1978); Union Nacional de
Trabajadores (Catalytic Indus. Maintenance Co.), 219 N.L.R.B. 414, 423-25 (1975),
enforced, 540 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); Union de
Tronquistas, Local 901 (Hotel La Concha), 193 N.L.R.B. 591, 594-96 (1971); Li-
thographers & Photoengravers Int'l Union, Local 223, 193 N.L.R.B. 11, 18-19
(1971).
12. E.g., Jericol Mining, Inc. v. Louisville & N.R.R., 88 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
11,904, at 23,678 (E.D. Ky. 1980); Union Nacional de Trabajadores (Jacobs Con-
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personal injury,' 3 property damage, 4 economic harm such as lost
wages' 5 or lost business,16 and interference with rights granted under
the NLRA.17
When such harm results from violence, the injured party may seek
relief from either the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or
Board), state courts or federal courts. Choice of forum is influenced by
the availability of remedies, and is limited by the doctrine of preemp-
tion. The general rule regarding preemption was established by the
Supreme Court in 1959 in San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Garmon.'8 Under Garmon, state and federal courts must yield exclu-
sive jurisdiction to the NLRB whenever the conduct to be regulated is
subject to NLRB jurisdiction 9 and is arguably protected by section 7
or arguably prohibited by section 8 of the Act.20
structors Co.), 219 N.L.R.B. 405, 407 (1975), enforced, 540 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); Union de Tronquistas, Local 901 (Hotel La
Concha), 193 N.L.R.B. 591, 594-96 (1971).
13. E.g., UAW, Local 552, 239 N.L.R.B. 312, 315 (1978); Union Nacional de
Trabajadores (Macal Container Corp.), 219 N.L.R.B. 429, 429-30 (1975), enforced,
540 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); Union de Tronquistas,
Local 901 (Hotel La Concha), 193 N.L.R.B. 591, 594-96 (1971): Lithographers &
Photoengravers Int'l Union, Local 223, 193 N.L.R.B. 11, 18-19 (1971).
14. E.g., UAW, Local 552, 239 N.L.R.B. 312, 315 (1978); Maywood Plant of
Grede Plastics, 235 N.L.R.B. 363, 367-68 (1978) (Member Murphy, dissenting in
part), modified on other grounds, 628 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Union de Tronquis-
tas, Local 901 (Hotel La Concha), 193 N.L.R.B. 591, 594-96 (1971); Lithographers
& Photoengravers Int'l Union, Local 223, 193 N.L.R.B. 11, 18-19 (1971).
15. E.g., UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 720 (1966); UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S.
634, 636-37 (1958); Union Nacional de Trabajadores (Catalytic Indus. Maintenance
Co.), 219 N.L.R.B. 414, 417 (1975) (Member Kennedy, dissenting in part), enforced,
540 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
16. E.g., UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 720 (1966); United Constr. Workers v.
Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 658 (1954); Ritchie v. UMW, 410 F.2d 827,
830 (6th Cir. 1969).
17. E.g., Union Nacional de Trabajadores (Jacobs Constructors Co.), 219
N.L.R.B. 405, 410 (1975), enforced, 540 F.2d I (Ist Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1039 (1977); Union de Tronquistas, Local 901 (Hotel La Concha), 193
N.L.R.B. 591, 598 (1971); Lithographers & Photoengravers Int'l Union, Local '23,
193 N.L.R.B. 11, 19 (1971).
18. 359 U.S. 236 (1959). For commentary on the Garnion preemption rule, see
Cox, Recent Developments In Federal Labor Law Preemption, 41 Ohio St. L.J. 277
(1980); Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1337 (1972); Note,
Labor Law: The "Compelling State Interest" Exception to the Federal Preemption
Doctrine, 51 Marq. L. Rev. 89 (1967): Note, Preemption in Labor Law Adjudica-
tions: A Case Where the Exceptions are Swallowing the Rule, 24 S.D. L. Rev. 466
(1979).
19. For a description of the NLRB's jurisdictional standards, see NLRB, A Guide
to Basic Law and Procedures Under the National Labor Relations Act 46-49 (rev. ed.
1978).
20. 359 U.S. at 245-46; accord Local 100, United Ass'n of Journeymen & Ap-
prentices v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 693-94 (1963): Stites v. Local 367, 430 P.2d 153,
154-55 (Alaska 1967).
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Section 7 of the Act gives employees the right to engage in concerted
activities for their mutual aid and protection or to refrain from such
activities. 21 Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor
practice for a labor organization or its agents to restrain or coerce
employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights. 22  Thus, a union
commits an unfair labor practice and impedes the policies of the Act
when it engages in violent misconduct that has the effect of restraining
or coercing employees.2 3
The Supreme Court has often recognized the special competence of
the NLRB to deal with unfair labor practices and thus to promote the
policies of the Act.2 4  In this regard, the NLRB has a variety of
remedies by which it provides relief to victims of strike violence. These
remedies include the issuance and posting of cease and desist orders, 25
withholding of a bargaining order when a bargaining order would
otherwise be appropriate, 26 and decertification of a union as the
exclusive collective bargaining representative of the employees.2 7 In
addition, the NLRB may seek court enforcement of its orders28 or
injunctions from the federal courts.29
The NLRB, however, has no power to award punitive damages and
only limited power to make compensatory awards.3 0 In exercise of
this power, the NLRB may issue backpay awards against a union for
21. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
22. Id. § 158(b)(1)(A).
23. See, e.g., Local Lodge No. 5, Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers, 249 N.L.R.B. 840,
851 (1980); International Ass'n of Machinists, 189 N.L.R.B. 50, 58 (1971); United
Furniture Workers, 139 N.L.R.B. 1279, 1284 (1962).
24. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266 (1975); American Ship
Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 316 (1965); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313
U.S. 177, 192-94 (1941); D. McDowell & K. Huhn, NLRB Remedies for Unfair
Labor Practices 6-7 (Indus. Research Unit, Labor Relations and Public Policy Series,
Rep. No. 12, 1976); see NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963);
NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 346-47 (1953).
25. E.g., Local Lodge No. 5, Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers, 249 N.L.R.B. 840, 851-
52 (1980); International Printing Pressmen & Assistant's Union No. 284, 230
N.L.R.B. 1104, 1106-07 (1977); Local 248, Meat & Allied Food Workers, 222
N.L.R.B. 1023, 1036 (1976), enforced mem., 84 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 10,826 (7th Cir.
1978).
26. E.g., Allou Distribs., Inc., 201 N.L.R.B. 47, 48 (1973); Bliss (Artcraft Man-
tel & Fireplace Co.), 174 N.L.R.B. 737, 743-45 (1969); Bernstein (Laura Modes
Co.), 144 N.L.R.B. 1592, 1594-96 (1963).
27. NLRB v. Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 540 F.2d 1, 13-15 (1st Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976).
29. Id. §§ 160(j), (1).
30. UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 646 (1958); see United Constr. Workers v.
Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 663-66 (1954). The Board may issue back-
pay awards, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976), and compensate union members when a
union wrongfully collects dues. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533,
539-41 (1943).
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wages lost by employees because of violence during a strike. 31  To
date, however, the Board has refused to use this remedy. 32
NLRB jurisdiction is not exclusive, exceptions to the Garimon pre-
emption rule exist. The power of the state courts to award compensa-
tory and punitive damages for losses inflicted by mass picketing or
other violence in a labor dispute is well-established.3 3 Federal courts
are also a proper forum for damage actions in limited situations. 3' In
addition, violent misconduct may be enjoined by state 35 and federal 3
courts. Furthermore, state and local authorities may prosecute those
engaging in violent misconduct under appropriate criminal laws, 37
and in a recent Ninth Circuit case, 38 federal criminal statutes-the
Hobbs Act,39 the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act, 40 and the Interstate and Foreign Travel or Transportation in Aid
of Racketeering Enterprise Act4 1-were applied to labor violence. 42
31. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976).
32. Union Nacional de Trabajadores (Catalytic Indus. Maintenance Co.), 219
N.L.R.B. 414, 414 (1975), enforced on other grounds, 540 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); Union de Tronquistas, Local 901 (Lock Joint Pipe
& Co.), 202 N.L.R.B 399, 399-400 (1973); see Drobena v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 1095,
1096-97 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 821 (1980).
33. UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 645-46 (1958); United Constr. Workers v.
Laburnum Constr. Corp. 347 U.S. 656, 663-66 (1954); United Aircraft Corp. v.
International Ass'n of Machinists, 161 Conn. 79, 83-84, 285 A.2d 330, 335 (1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972); Cliff House Bldg. Corp. v. Plumbers Union Local
690, 232 Pa. Super. 533, 536, 336 A.2d 339, 340-41 (1975).
34. See infra pt. II(A).
35. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959);
Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131, 138-39 (1957); UAW %. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266, 272-75 (1956); Allen-Bradley Local No.
1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740, 748-49 (1942); Milk
Wagon Drivers Union, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 292-
93 (1941).
36. The Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976), prohibits the issu-
ance of an injunction against legitimate labor activities. Id. § 104. Acts of violence,
however, can be restrained. Id. § 107; Scott v. Moore, 640 F.2d 708, 713-14, reh'g en
banc granted, 656 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1981).
37. People v. LoPresto, 9 Mich. App. 318, 332, 156 N.\V.2d 586, 594 (1967);
Newsday, Inc. v. Feldman, 8 A.D.2d 978, 978-79, 191 N.Y.S.2d 10, 12-13, motion
for leave to appeal denied, 9 A.D.2d 629, 191 N.Y.S.2d 547 (1959): see Russell v.
UAW, 258 Ala. 615, 620, 64 So. 2d 384, 388 (1953), aff'd on rehearing, 264 Ala. 456,
88 So. 2d 175 (1956), affd, 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
38. United States v. Thordarson, 646 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S.
Ct. 601 (1981).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976).
40. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1976).
42. United States v. Thordarson, 646 F.2d 1323, 1326-31 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 601 (1981). But see United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 401 (1973)
(minor picket-line violence held immune from prosecution under Hobbs Act).
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This Note emphasizes that remedies for injuries resulting from labor
violence should be aimed at compensating injured parties for harm
suffered as a result of the violence, deterring violence and promoting
industrial peace by effectuating the policies of the Act. Part I discusses
the NLRB's failure to attain these goals. Part II analyzes the extent to
which state and federal courts have succeeded where the NLRB has
failed. The Note concludes that because of the NLRB's special compe-
tence in the labor area, it should make greater use of its most powerful
sanctions in order to remedy and deter strike violence more effec-
tively.
I. THE SCOPE OF THE NLRB's REMEDIAL POWER
If the Board determines that an unfair labor practice has been
committed, it is empowered by section 10(c) of the Act to serve an
order requiring the violator "to cease and desist from such unfair labor
practice, and to take such affirmative action including reinstatement
of employees with or without backpay, as will effectuate the policies
of [the Act]."' 43 The policies of the NLRA that the Board seeks to
implement through its remedial powers are the promotion of free
collective bargaining and the protection of the freedom of workers to
organize, to form unions, to select their bargaining representatives
and to engage in, or to refrain from, concerted activities for their
mutual aid and protection. 44 A Board remedy will be invalid if it
conflicts with any of these statutory policies 4'" or if it is formulated to
accomplish an objective outside of the statutory grant. 46
A Board order must be remedial, not punitive. 7  An order is
remedial if it restores the status quo by removing any advantage
43. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976).
44. Id. § 151. The overriding purpose of the NLRA is to promote industrial
peace. NLRB v. Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 540 F.2d 1, 13 (Ist Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. .1039 (1977); see Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319
U.S. 533, 539 (1943); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941).
45. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 238 (1938); National Cash
Register Co. v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 945, 967 (6th Cir. 1972); see Republic Steel Corp. v.
NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 10-11 (1940); Daisy's Originals, Inc. v. NLRB, 468 F.2d 493, 498-
99 (5th Cir. 1972).
46. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 540 (1943); see H.K.
Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970); Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311
U.S. 7, 12-13 (1940).
47. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 11-12 (1940); Consolidated
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 236 (1938); see Local 60, Carpenters v. NLRB,
365 U.S. 651, 655 (1961); UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 643 (1958). The Supreme
Court has stated that it does not believe that "Congress intended to vest in the Board
a virtually unlimited discretion to devise punitive measures, and thus to prescribe
penalties or fines which the Board may think would effectuate the policies of the
Act." Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 11 (19,10).
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gained by a violator of the Act 48 or if it places an injured party in the
position he occupied prior to the commission of the unfair labor
practice. 49 Because Board remedies are designed to restore the status
quo, the Board may not levy penalties unrelated to actual injury.50
Thus, a remedy may not be formulated solely to effect deterrence.51 A
Board order, however, may act indirectly as a deterrent if its primary
aim is to effectuate the policies of the Act.52
Although the Board's remedies are limited in that they cannot be
punitive, or be designed solely to act as deterrents, the NLRA grants
to the NLRB broad discretion in remedying unfair labor practices.5
There is an infinite variety of specific situations that the Board may
have to remedy, and each remedy must be tailored to meet the
situation at hand. s4 That a particular remedy has not previously been
applied does not preclude its use in the appropriate circumstances.5
A. Non-Monetary Remedies
1. Cease and Desist Orders
The traditional Board remedy for a violation of section 8(b)(1)(A) is
the issuance of an order that directs the violator to cease and desist
48. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 540-41 (1943); D.
McDowell & K. Huhn, supra note 24, at 13; see NLRB v. Townhouse TV &
Appliances, Inc., 531 F.2d 826, 830 (7th Cir. 1976).
49. NLRB v. Florida Medical Center, Inc., 576 F.2d 667, 673 (5th Cir. 1978);
see Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 27 (1952), Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313
U.S. 177, 194 (1941); NLRB v. Townhouse TV & Appliances, Inc., 531 F.2d 826,
830 (7th Cir. 1976).
50. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 12 (1940); NLRB v. Rubatex
Corp., 601 F.2d 147, 153 (4th Cir. 1979) (Harvey, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); see Daisy's Originals, Inc. v. NLRB, 468 F.2d 493, 498-99 (5th
Cir. 1972).
51. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 11-12 (1940); Bell & Howell Co.
v. NLRB, 598 F.2d 136, 147 n.36 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 942 (1979);
National Cash Register Co. v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 945, 968 (6th Cir. 1972), NLRB v.
Coats & Clark, Inc., 241 F.2d 556, 560 (5th Cir. 1957).
52. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 12 (1940); see Daisy's Originals,
Inc. v. NLRB, 468 F.2d 493, 499 (5th Cir. 1972); D. McDowell & K. Huhn, supra
note 24, at 14.
53. Local 60, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651, 655
(1961); NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 361 U.S. 398, 412 (1960); Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941); see 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976). The
statutory grant of authority by Congress, see supra text accompanying note 43,
recognizes the special competence of the NLRB to handle unfair labor practices.
Therefore, Board remedial orders are subject to judicial review solely on questions of
law, not on matters of policy. NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S.
87, 96 & n.28 (1957); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941).
54. Local 60, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651, 655
(1961); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941).
55. See Local 60, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651,
655 (1961); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941).
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from the specific conduct that violated the Act. 56 Cease and desist
orders generally require the violator to post a notice that sets forth the
terms and conditions of the order. 57  When the acts of violence are
repeated or particularly egregious, extraordinary notification require-
ments-mailing of copies of the order to all employees58 or publica-
56. R. Gorman, Basic Text on Labor Law, Unionization and Collective Bargain-
ing 287 (1976); D. McDowell & K. Huhn, supra note 24, at 19. Section 10(c)
empowers the NLRB to issue cease and desist orders. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976). In
fashioning a cease and desist order, the Board must consider the nature and serious-
ness of the unfair labor practices, the offender's past history of violations and the
likelihood of recurrence. NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426, 436-37
(1941). The order is typically framed in terms of a promise that the violator will
refrain from such conduct. For example, a cease and desist order issued against
Union de Empleados read as follows: "WE WILL NOT threaten to inflict bodily
harm nor shall we inflict bodily harm upon any of our members or any employee of
National Packing Company or any member of their families nor damage their
property because any of our members or the employees of National Packing Com-
pany exercise their rights not to join or assist this Union in strike activities." Union de
Empleados, 192 N.L.R.B. 700, 700 (1971). A cease and desist order may be either
narrow, prohibiting specific acts of misconduct, or broad. Broad orders have been
found to be appropriate when there is an extensive pattern of serious strike-associated
misconduct and when the union fails to take any consequential steps to stop or curtail
such activity by its members, Local 248, Meat & Allied Food Workers, 222 N.L.R.B.
1023, 1023 (1976), enjorced mem., 84 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 10,826 (7th Cir. 1978), or
when the union has a proclivity to violate the Act by engaging in widespread
misconduct that demonstrates a general disregard for employees' statutory rights.
Hickmott Foods, Inc.. 242 N.L.R.B. 1357, 1357 (1979); Union Nacional de Trabaja-
dores (Jacobs Constructors Co.), 219 N.L.R.B. 405, 411-12 (1975), enforced, 540
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977). Broad orders typically
require the violator to cease and desist from both specific acts of misconduct and
from restraining or coercing employees "in any other manner" in their exercise of § 7
rights. E.g., Union de Tronquistas, Local 901 (Lock Joint Pipe & Co.), 202 N.L.R.B.
399, 407 (1973); International Ass'n of Machinists, 189 N.L.R.B. 50, 58 (1971); Local
115, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 186 N.LR.B. 56, 62 (1970). They may forbid violence
not only against employees of a particular employer, but also against employees of
any other employer engaged in commerce, District 1199, Nat'l Union of Hosp. &
Health Care Employees, 245 N.L.R.B. 800, 806 (1979), or within a certain geo-
graphic area. Union de Tronquistas, Local 901 (Hotel La Concha), 193 N.L.R.B.
591, 598 (1971).
57. R. Gorman, supra note 56, at 287; D. McDowell & K. Huhn, supra note 24,
at 73; see, e.g., Local Lodge No. 5, Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers, 249 N.L.R.B. 840,
852 (1980); Union de Tronquistas, Local 901 (Lock Joint Pipe & Co.), 202 N.L.R.B.
399, 407 (1977); Lithographers & Photoengravers Int'l Union, Local 223, 193
N.L.R.B. 11, 22 (1971). To comply with such an order, the violator will be required
to maintain the notice in a conspicuous location for a period of sixty days. E.g., Local
Lodge No. 5, Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers, 249 N.L.R.B. 840, 852 (1980); Union de
Tronquistas, Local 901 (Lock Joint Pipe & Co.), 202 N.L.R.B. 399, 407 (1977);
Lithographers & Photoengravers Int'l Union, Local 22-3, 193 N.L.R.B. 11, 22 (1971).
58. See NLRB v. Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 540 F.2d 1, 11-12 (1st Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); Union de Tronquistas, Local 901 (Hotel
La Concha), 193 N.L.R.B. 591, 599 (1971).
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tion of the order in a local newspaper 9 -are warranted to neutralize
the effects of such conduct. These strong measures demonstrate to all
affected employees that the Board has taken steps to alleviate the
coercive effects of the unfair labor practices. 60
Board orders, however, are not self-enforcing. Instead, the Board
must petition the federal courts of appeal for enforcement.0 ' Al-
though a Board decision cannot be overturned if it is supported by
"evidence [that] appear[s] substantial when viewed on the record as a
whole,16 2 the appellate courts need not "stand aside and rubber-
stamp their affirmance of administrative decisions that they deem
inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate the congressio-
nal policy underlying a statute. '6 3 Thus, in some cases, the courts
have either modified 64 or denied enforcement6 5 of Board orders.
Once a court of appeals enforces a Board order, however, it be-
comes a lawful decree of that court.6 6 If a violator refuses to comply
with the enforced order or commits another violation similar to that
prohibited by the cease and desist order, the Board may request the
court to impose civil or criminal contempt sanctions to encourage
compliance. 67  Although imposition of these powerful sanctions po-
59. See Teamsters Local 115 v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 392, 401 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 119 (1981); NLRB v. Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 540 F.2d
1, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977). In one case in which the
union's conduct was flagrant, the Board required the union president to sign the
notice and read it aloud at assemblies of all union members. Fruin-Colnon Corp.,
227 N.L.R.B. 59, 59 (1976).
60. NLRB v. Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 540 F.2d 1, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
61. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976).
62. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 490 (1951); accord NLRB
v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291 (1965); NLRB v. Max Factor & Co., 640 F.2d 197, 204
(9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 983 (1981); NLRB v. Atkins Saw Div. of
Nicholson File Co., 399 F.2d 907, 910 (5th Cir. 1968).
63. NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291 (1965); accord NLRB v. Atkins Saw Div.
of Nicholson File Co., 399 F.2d 907, 910 (5th Cir. 1968) (quoting NLRB v. Brown,
380 U.S. 278, 291 (1965)); see Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488
(1951).
64. E.g., NLRB v. Maywood Plant of Grede Plastics, 628 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir.
1980); NLRB v. Teamsters Local Union 327, 432 F.2d 933, 935 (6th Cir. 1970);
Retail Clerks Union Local 770 v. NLRB, 296 F.2d 368, 375 (D.C. Cir. 1961); NLRB
v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 293 F.2d 300, 310 (5th Cir. 1961).
65. E.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 539 F.2d 1335, 1339 (4th Cir.
1976); NLRB v. Keller-Crescent Co., 538 F.2d 1291, 1301 (7th Cir. 1976); Great
Lakes Screw Corp. v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 375, 382 (7th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Atkins Saw
Div. of Nicholson File Co., 399 F.2d 907, 912 (5th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Brown, 319
F.2d 7, 11 (10th Cir. 1963), aff'd, 380 U.S. 278 (1965); NLRB v. Latex Indus., Inc.,
307 F.2d 737, 740 (6th Cir. 1962).
66. D. McDowell & K. Huhn, supra note 24, at 246; see A. Goldman, Labor
Law and Industrial Relations in the United States of America 730, at 283 (1979).
67. NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426, 433 (1941); see NLRB v.
Teamsters, Local No. 327, 592 F.2d 921, 922 (6th Cir. 1979). The sanctions available
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tentially strengthens the Board's remedial power and assists it in effec-
tuating the policies of the Act, the burden of proof with respect to the
propriety of the sanctions rests with the Board. 8 The Board must
demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence, not merely by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the contemnor violated the court-
enforced Board order.6 9 The effectiveness of cease and desist orders
coupled with posting requirements is thus limited to the extent to
which the Board is able to obtain enforcement in the courts and to
meet the strict burden of proof requirements in contempt proceedings.
The effectiveness of cease and desist orders, however, is more fun-
damentally limited by the delay inherent in the Board's procedures.
Many months often pass between the occurrence of an unfair labor
practice that results in harm and the issuance of a Board order.70
These limitations may explain the disregard some parties hold for
orders of the Board. 7' Nonetheless, cease and desist orders remain the
to the court for civil contempt are those "necessary under the circumstances to grant
full remedial relief, to coerce the contemnor into compliance . . . and to fully
compensate the complainant for losses sustained." NLRB v. Vander Wal, 316 F.2d
631, 634 (9th Cir. 1963) (per curiam) (footnote omitted); accord United States v.
UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 303-04 (1947); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S.
418, 448 (1911). If the court's decree is "knowingly, willfully and intentionally"
violated, the Board may petition the court to hold the violator in criminal contempt,
thereby subjecting him to fines and imprisonment. In re Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 386
F.2d 309, 316 (5th Cir. 1967); accord United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 303-04
(1947); NLRB v. Star Metal Mfg. Co., 187 F.2d 856, 857 (3d Cir. 1951).
68. NLRB v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 538 F.2d 1152, 1160 (5th Cir. 1976); NLRB v.
Southwire Co., 429 F.2d 1050, 1053 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 939
(1971); NLRB v. Laney & Duke Storage Warehouse Co., 424 F.2d 109, 112 (5th Cir.
1970); see NLRB v. John Zink Co., 551 F.2d 799, 801 (10th Cir. 1977).
69. NLRB v. John Zink Co., 551 F.2d 799, 801 (10th Cir. 1977); NLRB v. J.P.
Stevens & Co., 538 F.2d 1152, 1160 (5th Cir. 1976); NLRB v. Southwire Co., 429
F.2d 1050, 1053 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 939 (1971); NLRB v. Laney
& Duke Storage Warehouse Co., 424 F.2d 109, 112 (5th Cir. 1970).
70. S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB,
Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, at 407, 414
(1948); A. Cox, D. Bok & R. Gorman, Cases and Materials on Labor Law 258 (9th
ed. 1981); Note, NLRB Power To Award Damages In Unfair Labor Practice Cases,
84 Harv. L. Rev. 1670, 1671 (1971) [hereinafter cited as NLRB Power].
71. E.g., Union Nacional de Trabajadores (Catalytic Indus. Maintenance Co.),
219 N.L.R.B. 414, 419 & n.19 (1975) (Member Kennedy, dissenting in part), en-
forced, 540 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); Union
Nacional de Trabajadores (Jacobs Constructors Co.), 219 N.L.R.B. 405, 411-12
(1975), enforced, 540 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977),
Union de Tronquistas, Local 901 (Lock Joint Pipe & Co.), 202 N.L.R.B. 399, 407
(1973). The disrespect certain parties hold for the NLRB is epitomized by the testi-
mony of a union agent at the administrative hearing in Jacobs Constructors Co.,
during which he stated that he " '[did] not recognize the authority of the law or of
[Vol. 501380
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primary Board remedy, 72 although they are effective only when ap-
plied to unions that exhibit a preference to abide by the law. Although
the Board has broad discretion in formulating remedies, 73 it has lim-
ited its use of section 10(j) injunctions and other remedies that could
deal with strike violence more effectively than cease and desist orders.
2. Section 10(j) Injunctions
Board remedial power is bolstered by section 10(j) of the Act, which
grants the NLRB the power to seek a temporary injunction from a
federal district court immediately upon the Board's issuance of an
unfair labor practice complaint.74  The use of this remedy would be
more effective than the issuance of a cease and desist order because the
delay inherent in cease and desist orders is not present when an
injunction is sought. 5 Section 10() injunctions, however, are infre-
quently used weapons in the Board's arsenal of remedies.70  The
Board has "exercis[ed] its power 'not as a broad sword, but as a
scalpel, ever mindful of the dangers inherent in conducting labor
management relations by way of injunction.' ,77
The concerns expressed by the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
in 193278 may explain the Board's reluctance to seek injunctions.79
the Board that administers the law.'" 219 N.L.R.B. at 412. He further testified that
"the laws that are in effect in this country [should] be applied in a manner favorable
to the workers and when they cannot be they should be violated." Id.
72. See sources cited supra note 56.
73. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
74. 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1976).
75. Note, Temporary Injunctions Under Section 10(j) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 44
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 181, 188 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Temporary Injunctions]; Note,
Section 10() of the National Labor Relations Act: A Legislative, Administrative and
Judicial Look at a Potentially Effective (But Seldom Used) Remedy, 18 Santa Clara
L. Rev. 1021, 1023-24 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Section 10(j)]; see S. Rep. No. 105,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 27 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, Legislative History of the
Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, at 407, 414, 433 (1948).
76. Siegel, Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act: Suggested Reforms
for an Expanded Use, 13 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 457, 457 (1972); Temporary
Injunctions, supra note 75, at 182; Section 10(j), supra note 75, at 1022; Recent
Development, The 10() Labor Injunction: An Exercise in Statutory Construction, 42
Wash. L. Rev. 1117, 1128 (1967).
77. McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 366 F.2d 847, 849-50 (2d Cir. 1966) (quoting
Address by Frank W. McCulloch, Chairman of the NLRB, The NLRB in Action,
before the Eighth Annual Joint Industrial Relations Conference, Michigan State
University (Apr. 19, 1962)), judgment set aside on other grounds per curiam, 385
U.S. 533 (1967).
78. Pub. L. No. 72-65, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115
(1976)).
79. Section 10(j), supra note 75, at 1032-33; see McLeod v. General Elec. Co.,
366 F.2d 847, 849-50 (2d Cir. 1966), judgment set aside on other grounds per
curiam, 385 U.S. 533 (1967).
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Prior to its passage, labor injunctions were readily obtained by em-
ployers and were used to counter the economic weapons used by labor
unions: strikes, boycotts and picketing. 80 The widespread use of labor
injunctions, however, impeded workers' participation in concerted
activities. 8 ' To counter these dangers, Congress passed the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, 2 thereby severely limiting the power of federal courts
to issue labor injunctions. 83
Section 10(j) is an exception to Norris-LaGuardia's prohibition
against injunctive relief.8 4  Section 10(h) of the NLRA states that
"[w]hen granting appropriate temporary relief or a restraining order,
. . . the jurisdiction of courts sitting in equity shall not be limited by
[the Norris-LaGuardia Act]." 85  Congress sought to provide the
NLRB with the power to act in the public interest by seeking injunc-
tive relief in all types of unfair labor practice cases in order to elimi-
nate obstructions to free collective bargaining promptly. 86
A prerequisite to the granting of a section 10(j) injunction is that the
Board has correctly determined that there is reasonable cause to be-
lieve that the unlawful conduct constitutes an unfair labor practice. 8
80. Scott v. Moore, 640 F.2d 708, 713, reh'g en banc granted, 656 F.2d 108 (5th
Cir. 1981); S. Cohen, Labor Law 104-05 (1964) [hereinafter cited as S. Cohen II]; A.
Goldman, supra note 66, at 50; C. Gregory & H. Katz, supra note 3, at 99-104.
81. Scott v. Moore, 640 F.2d 708, 713, reh'g en banc granted, 656 F.2d 108 (5th
Cir. 1981); C. Gregory & H. Katz, supra note 3, at 99-104; see S. Cohen II, supra
note 80, at 104-05.
82. Scott v. Moore, 640 F.2d 708, 713, reh'g en bane granted, 656 F.2d 108 (5th
Cir. 1981); A. Goldman, supra note 66, at 51; see McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 366
F.2d 847, 849-50 (2d Cir. 1966), judgment set aside on other grounds per curian,
385 U.S. 533 (1967).
83. Scott v. Moore, 640 F.2d 708, 713-14, reh'g en banc granted, 656 F.2d 108
(5th Cir. 1981); McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 366 F.2d 847, 849 (2d Cir. 1966),
judgment set aside on other grounds per curiam, 385 U.S. 533 (1967); W. Connolly &
M. Connolly, Work Stoppages and Union Responsibility 172 (1977); A. Goldman,
supra note 66, at 51; Stewart & Townsend, Strike Violence: The Need For Federal
Injunctions, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. 459, 462 (1966); Note, A Survey of Labor Remedies,
54 Va. L. Rev. 38, 120 (1968).
84. McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 366 F.2d 847, 849 (2d Cir. 1966), judgment
set aside on other grounds per curiam, 385 U.S. 533 (1967); Douds v. Local 294, Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters, 75 F. Supp. 414, 418 (N.D.N.Y. 1947); 29 U.S.C. § 160(h)
(1976); W. Connolly & M. Connolly, supra note 83, at 197; Siegel, supra note 76, at
457; Section 10(j), supra note 75, at 1025-26.
85. 29 U.S.C. § 160(h) (1976).
86. S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 27 (1947), reprinted in I NLRB,
Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, at 407, 414, 433
(1948).
87. Johnston v. Evans, 223 F. Supp. 766, 769 (E.I).N.C. 1963); see Minnesota
Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Meter, 385 F.2d 265, 269 (8th Cir. 1967); Angle v. Sacks, 382
F.2d 655, 658 (10th Cir. 1967); McLeod v. Compressed Air Workers, 292 F.2d 358,
361 (2d Cir. 1961); Douds v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 241 F.2d 278, 285
(2d Cir. 1957).
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The Act requires that an injunction be issued only when it is "just and
proper."8 s The vagueness of the "just and proper" standard of section
10(j) has led to various interpretations by the federal courts. In Angle
v. Sacks,"9 the Tenth Circuit stated that it would not grant temporary
relief under section 10(j) unless the circumstances demonstrated "a
probability that the purposes of the Act [would] be frustrated."9 10 The
Second Circuit, in McLeod v. General Electric Co. ,9 applied a differ-
ent standard: It refused to issue an injunction because the NLRB did
not demonstrate the necessity of an injunction to preserve the status
quo or to prevent irreparable harm.9 2 In Minnesota Mining & Manu-
facturing Co. v. Meter,9 3 the Eighth Circuit, noting that reasonable
cause alone was insufficient for the granting of a section 10(j) injunc-
tion, stated that "[s]ection 10(j) is reserved for a more serious and
extraordinary set of circumstances where the unfair labor practices,
unless contained, would have an adverse and deleterious effect on the
rights of the aggrieved party which could not be remedied through the
normal Board channels. '" 94
The unusually strict standard applied by the Eighth Circuit is
unwarranted. Section 10(j) is an exception to the Norris-LaGuardia
Act;9 5 therefore, federal courts sitting in equity should apply tradi-
tional requirements, such as preservation of the status quo or irrepara-
ble harm, and should not require a "serious and extraordinary set of
circumstances" before issuing a section 10(j) injunction. Because sec-
tion 10(j) allows the NLRB to seek injunctions to eliminate obstruc-
tions to free collective bargaining promptly, and violence in the course
of a labor dispute is a major obstacle to free collective bargaining, use
of section 10(j) injunctions in labor violence cases is appropriate and
should be encouraged in order to promote the policies of the Act.
3. Withholding of a Bargaining Order
Another seldom used remedy for dealing with strike violence is the
withholding of a bargaining order. 6 When an employer has violated
88. 29 U.S.C. § 1600) (1976); see Eisenberg %. Hartz Mountain Corp., 519 F.2d
138, 142 (3d Cir. 1975); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Meter, 385 F.2d 265, 269
(8th Cir. 1967).
89. 382 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1967).
90. Id. at 660.
91. 366 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1966), judgment set aside on other grounds per curiarn,
385 U.S. 533 (1967).
92. Id. at 850.
93. 385 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1967).
94. id. at 270.
95. See sources cited supra note 84.
96. Note, Union Violence and Bargaining Orders: A New Approach to Laura
Modes, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1640, 1640 (1979) [hereinafter cited as New Approach]-
see D. McDowell & K. Huhn, supra note 24, at 197.
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his statutory duty to bargain 97 by committing unfair labor practices
that undermine the union's majority status and preclude the possibil-
ity of holding a fair representation election, the NLRB may issue a
bargaining order against the employer.98 Union violence, however,
has been held to relieve the employer of its duty to comply with the
bargaining order until the union can demonstrate majority support by
winning an election supervised by the Board.9  Freeing the employer
from its duty to bargain is known as the Laura Modes defense. 00
The Board considers the denial of a bargaining order an extraordi-
nary sanction ' 0' in that use of this remedy would deprive a substantial
group of employees of the advantages of collective bargaining on the
basis of a few employees' misconduct.10 2 The Board has been reluc-
tant to withhold an otherwise appropriate bargaining order, even
when the violence has been rather extensive. 0 3  Most instances of
97. Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees." 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). Section 8(d) defines the duty to bargain as "the perform-
ance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employ-
ees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement
• . . and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if
requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree
to a proposal or require the making of a concession." Id. § 158(d).
98. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 613-14 (1969); Donovan v.
NLRB, 520 F.2d 1316, 1322 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1053 (1976); J.P.
Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 514, 519-21 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 830
(1971); NLRB v. Lou De Young's Market Basket, Inc., 430 F.2d 912, 914 (6th Cir.
1970).
99. Allou Distribs., Inc., 201 N.L.R.B. 47, 48 (1973); Bliss (Artcraft Mantel &
Fireplace Co.), 174 N.L.R.B. 737, 743-45 (1969); Bernstein (Laura Modes Co.), 144
N.L.R.B. 1592, 1594-96 (1963).
100. Bernstein (Laura Modes Co.), 144 N.L.R.B. 1592 (1963), was the first case in
which the Board relieved an employer of his duty to bargain because a union had
engaged in violent misconduct. Since then, the "Laura Modes defense" has been
raised frequently when an employer has incurred a bargaining order, and a union
has engaged in violence. See, e.g., Maywood Plant of Grede Plastics, 235 N.L.R.B.
363, 363 (1978), modified on other grounds, 628 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Allou
Distribs., Inc., 201 N.L.R.B. 47, 47 (1973); Quintree Distribs., Inc., 198 N.L.R.B.
390, 404-05 (1972).
101. Donovan v. NLRB, 520 F.2d 1316, 1321 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1053 (1976); Highland Plastics, Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. No. 28, at 38 (Sept. 29,
1980); Philadelphia Ambulance Serv., Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. 1070, 1079 (1978); May-
wood Plant of Grede Plastics, 235 N.L.R.B. 363, 365-66 (1978), modified on other
grounds, 628 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United Mineral & Chem. Corp., 155
N.L.R.B. 1390, 1396 (1965), enforcement denied in part, 391 F.2d 829 (2d Cir.
1968).
102. Donovan v. NLRB, 520 F.2d 1316, 1321 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1053 (1976); Highland Plastics, Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. No. 28, at 39 (Sept. 29,
1980).
103. E.g., Maywood Plant of Grede Plastics, 235 N.L.R.B. 363, 367-68 (1978)
(Member Murphy, dissenting in part), modified on other grounds, 628 F.2d 1 (D.C.
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union misconduct result in the issuance of a cease and desist order, "3'
but before the Board will withhold a bargaining order, it requires
evidence of deliberate attempts by the union to circumvent the proce-
dures and policies of the Act through violence and coercion.3 5
Five factors have been set forth by the NLRB to be considered in
determining whether a bargaining order should be denied due to
union misconduct: (1) the extent of the union's interest in pursuing
legal remedies; (2) evidence of deliberate planning of the acts of
violence and intimidation attributable to the union; (3) whether as-
saults by union advocates were provoked; (4) the duration of the
union's misconduct; and (5) the relative gravity of the union's miscon-
duct as opposed to that of the employer.' 0 6
In Maywood Plant of Grede Plastics,37 the Board refused to with-
hold a bargaining order despite flagrant union violence, in part,
because the employer provoked the union by engaging in unfair labor
practices. 0 8 The union misconduct included threats and physical
assaults against employees and managers, the breaking of windows of
automobiles entering the plant, forcibly removing employees from
vehicles, spraying irritants at employees and pursuing cars driven by
nonstriking employees in an attempt to cause accidents.3 9 The un-
ion's violence was not found by the Board to be sufficiently deliberate
as to warrant the denial of a bargaining order."10 Deliberate or not,
the coercive effect of the violence on the bargaining process is the
same. Furthermore, by weighing the union's violence against the
employer's violations, the Board is ignoring the coercive effects of the
union misconduct on the employees' right to choose their collective
bargaining representative freely. "'
Cir. 1980); Quintree Distribs., Inc., 198 N.L.R.B. 390, 404-05 (1972); United Min-
eral & Chem. Corp., 155 N.L.R.B. 1390, 1395-96 (1965), enforcement denied in
part, 391 F.2d 829 (2d Cir. 1968).
104. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
105. Maywood Plant of Grede Plastics, 235 N.L.R.B. 363, 365 (1978), modified
on other grounds, 628 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1980): Allou Distribs., Inc., 201 N.L.R.B.
47, 48 (1973); New Approach, supra note 96, at 1650-52.
106. Maywood Plant of Grede Plastics, 235 N.L.R.B. 363, 365 (1978), modified
on other grounds, 628 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
107. 235 N.L.R.B. 363 (1978), modified on other grounds, 628 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
108. Id. at 366. The employer's unlawful conduct consisted of a campaign to oust
the union by threats and promises directed at its employees. Id. at 364. Employees
were interrogated and subject to surveillance. Id. Furthermore, the employer refused
to bargain with the union and sought to discontinue the union's dues checkoff
procedure. Id. On one occasion, a company guard brandished a gun in a scuffle with
several union adherents. Id. at 366 & n.9.
109. Id. at 367-68 (Member Murphy, dissenting in part).
110. Id. at 365-66.
111. NLRB v. Triumph Curing Center, 571 F.2d 462, 478-80 (9th Cir. 1978)
(Hufstedler, J., concurring and dissenting); New Approach, supra note 96, at 1658-
59.
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The granting or withholding of a bargaining order should not be
used by the Board to reward or punish employers and unions." 2
Instead, it should be used to promote the employees' right to bargain
collectively through the representative of their choice. Greater use of
this Board sanction could serve to encourage union officers and agents
to police their picket lines in an effort to curb misconduct that may
result in the withholding of a bargaining order. Because the coercive
effects of the union violence may result in a diminution or loss of
majority support, the Board should consider withholding the bargain-
ing order until the union can once again demonstrate majority support
in a representation election. 1 3 Focusing on the effects of union vio-
lence on the bargaining process should result in more successful Laura
Modes defenses because flagrant violence is likely to interfere with the
employees' free choice of bargaining representative. 1 4 The increased
use of this remedy would therefore aid in deterring violence as well as
promoting the purposes of the Act by furthering peaceful collective
bargaining.
4. Decertification
The threat or actual use of cease and desist orders is ineffective in
controlling labor violence when applied to certain parties. "5 Even
greater Board use of section 10(j) injunctions and more frequent deni-
als of bargaining orders may not be sufficient to deter some unions
from engaging in egregious violent misconduct. When a union has
demonstrated utter disregard for the peaceful purposes of the Act, and
has committed serious violence, the NLRB may decertify that union as
the exclusive collective bargaining representative of the employees." 0
The Board has done so, however, in only one strike violence case. In
NLRB v. Union Nacional de Trabajadores,117 the Board revoked the
certification of a union that had engaged in physical attacks and
threatened further violence against employers and employees at vari-
ous jobsites.118
112. See NLRB v. Triumph Curing Center, 571 F.2d 462, 479-80 (9th Cir. 1978)
(Hufstedler, J., concurring and dissenting); New Approach, supra note 96, at 1658-
59.
113. NLRB v. Triumph Curing Center, 571 F.2d 462, 479 (9th Cir. 1978)
(Hufstedler, J., concurring and dissenting); New Approach, supra note 96, at 1659.
114. See New Approach, supra note 96, at 1664.
115. See supra pt. I(A)(1).
116. NLRB v. Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 540 F.2d 1, 13-15 (1st Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); cf. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local No.
671, 199 N.L.R.B. 994, 994 (1972) (decertification appropriate for breach of duty of
fair representation); Hughes Tool Co., 104 N.LR.B. 318, 329 (1953) (same).
117. 540 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
118. Id. at 6-12.
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The First Circuit Court of Appeals, although permitting decertifi-
cation,119 cautioned against the use of this drastic remedy. °20 Noting
that a certified union is presumed to enjoy the support of a majority of
the employees it represents, the court argued that decertification
would nullify the interests of the majority; before the Board under-
takes such a serious step, it should be certain that no adequate alterna-
tive means are available to promote the policies of the Act. The court
noted that alternative means of attempting to control violence exist:
When the violence affects the bargaining process, withholding of a
bargaining order is appropriate; when violence affects employee sec-
tion 7 rights, section 8(b)(1)(A) remedies, such as a cease and desist
order, are appropriate. In the court's view, it is only when these
remedies would be ineffective in controlling the violence that the
extreme remedy of decertification is appropriate to achieve the over-
riding purpose of the Act-promotion of industrial peace. ' 2 '
It should be realized, however, that cease and desist orders are
often ineffective, and that the denial of a bargaining order is an
infrequently used remedy. When a union has an extensive record of
serious violent misconduct that prevents constructive collective bar-
gaining from taking place on behalf of the employees that selected it
as their representative, the Board should consider decertification to be
an appropriate remedy. Although decertification is a harsh remedy, it
falls within the NLRB's scope of remedial authority.'2 It serves to
undo the effects of the unfair labor practices committed by removing
the union, which has restrained the employees' free exercise of their
bargaining rights. Even though the employees selected the union to be
their bargaining representative, if constructive bargaining cannot take
place because of the coercive effects of the union's violence, the em-
ployees' interest will be better served through another union that
abides by the policies of the Act and attempts to promote peaceful
collective bargaining.
119. The court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review the Board's decer-
tification order. Id. at 12-13. Nevertheless, the court proceeded to issue advisory
statements concerning the use of decertification as a remedy against violence. Id. at
13-15.
120. Id. In providing guidance for future decertification cases, the court suggested
that the Board consider certain factors: (1) the effect of the union's misconduct at the
particular plant where the violence occurred, as opposed to unrelated jobsites, on the
representational and collective bargaining processes; (2) whether the objectives of the
Act could be promoted equally well by alternative remedies; and (3) the union's
proclivity for unlawful conduct. Id. at 14-15.
121. Id. at 13-14.
122. Id.; International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 671, 199 N.L.R.B. 994, 994
(1972); see Catalytic Indus. Maintenance Co., 209 N.L.R.B. 641, 641 (1974); Hughes
Tool Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 318, 321-22 (1953).
1982] 1387
1388 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50
B. Monetary Remedies
In remedying the effects of strike violence on the individual, the
NLRB has the statutory authority to order reinstatement of a dis-
charged employee1 23 and to require the payment of money to compen-
123. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976). A striking employee's right to reinstatement is
determined by whether the work stoppage engaged in was an economic strike or an
unfair labor practice strike. NLRB v. Thayer Co., 213 F.2d 748, 752-53 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 883 (1954). An economic strike is a work stoppage by employ-
ees in support of bargaining demands regarding wages and working conditions, or
requests for union recognition by the employer. R. Doherty & G. DeMarchi, Indus-
trial and Labor Relations Terms: A Glossary for Students and Teachers 30 (3d ed.
1974); R. Gorman, supra note 56, at 339. An unfair labor practice strike is a work
stoppage by employees provoked by an employer's unfair labor practice. NLRB v.
Thayer Co., 213 F.2d 748, 752-53 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 883 (1954); R.
Gorman, supra note 56, at 339. An economic strike may be converted into an unfair
labor practice strike by the commission of an unfair labor practice by the employer
that has the effect of prolonging the strike. Id.; see, e.g., NLRB v. Crosby Chem.,
Inc., 188 F.2d 91, 95 (5th Cir. 1951); Grand Lodge of Free & Accepted Masons, 215
N.L.R.B. 75, 86 (1974), enforced, 548 F.2d 1276 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
822 (1977). Economic strikers' rights to reinstatement developed over a thirty-year
period. Initially, emphasis was placed on the employer's economic situation. An
employer was permitted to hire replacements for strikers and thereafter refuse to
rehire the strikers. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938).
Strikers' rights were further limited when the Seventh Circuit held that an employer
need not hire a striker if his job is abolished or absorbed by other employees.
Chauffeurs "General" Local No. 200 v. NLRB, 233 F.2d 233, 238 (7th Cir. 1956).
Concern then shifted from the employer to the economic striker. The Supreme Court
stated, in 1965, that an employer's refusal to reemploy strikers may not be based
upon anti-union animus. NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 287-88 (1965) (dictum).
Two years later, the Supreme Court held that an employer must rehire strikers as
jobs become available. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer, Co., 389 U.S. 375, 380-81
(1967). A year later, the Board established that strikers are entitled to be reinstated as
vacancies occur unless they have obtained regular and substantially equivalent em-
ployment elsewhere, or the employer is able to establish legitimate and substantial
business reasons to justify his failure to offer reinstatement. Laidlaw Corp., 171
N.L.R.B. 1366, 1369-70 (1968), enforced, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 920 (1970). In contrast, an unfair labor practice striker's right to reinstate-
ment is absolute, Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 285-86 (1956); NLRB
v. Fotochrome, Inc., 343 F.2d 631, 633 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 833 (1965),
provided that the employee has not engaged in any misconduct justifying his dis-
charge. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 264 (1939) (Stone, J.,
concurring); Oneita Knitting Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 375 F.2d 385, 390 (4th Cir. 1967).
Section 10(c) of the Act prohibits the NLRB from ordering the reinstatement of any
employee discharged "'for cause." 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976). Strike misconduct
constitutes sufficient cause for an employer's refusal to reinstate economic strikers.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 449 F.2d 511, 513 (5th Cir. 1971); W.J.
Ruscoe Co. v. NLRB, 406 F.2d 725, 727 (6th Cir. 1969); Standard Lime & Stone Co.
v. NLRB, 97 F.2d 531, 536 (4th Cir. 1938). The Board must also consider the impact
of an employer's unfair labor practice in determining whether the violent misconduct
of unfair labor practice strikers should bar their reinstatement. Local 883, UAW v.
NLRB, 300 F.2d 699, 702-03 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 911 (1962); NLRB
v. Thayer Co., 213 F.2d 748, 757 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 883 (1954); R.
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sate an employee who has suffered lost wages as a result of another's
unlawful conduct.' 2 4  The purpose of these orders is to place the
injured party in the same economic position he would have been in
had the unlawful conduct not been committed.'2 5
Despite this statutory power, the NLRB has consistently held that it
will not impose a backpay award against a union in favor of employ-
ees coerced by violence into joining a strike.12'  The NLRB has,
however, imposed backpay awards against unions in other situations:
Gorman, supra note 56, at 349-50: Sahm, Picket-Line Misconduct and Employee
Reinstatement, 56 A.B.A. J. 561, 563-64 (1970). Under this balancing approach, the
employer's right to refuse to reinstate has been upheld where the employee caused
property damage, W.J. Ruscoe Co. v. NLRB, 406 F.2d 725, 726-27 (6th Cir. 1969);
NLRB v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 147 F.2d 262, 267-68 (6th Cir. 1945); Standard
Lime & Stone Co. v. NLRB, 97 F.2d 531, 533-34, 536 (4th Cir. 1938), or engaged in
physical violence. Oneita Knitting Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 375 F.2d 385, 392-93 (4th
Cir. 1967); Standard Lime & Stone Co. v. NLRB, 97 F.2d 531, 534-36 (4th Cir.
1938). Not all violent misconduct, however, will preclude reinstatement. Courts
have recognized a distinction between situations in which the employee engaged in
protected concerted activitiy but entered the realm of unlawful conduct spontane-
ously, and cases in which the violent misconduct was so flagrant as to bar the right to
reinstatement. Compare NLRB v. Wallick, 198 F.2d 477, 484-85 (3d Cir. 1952)
(minor violence not a bar to reinstatement), and Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 107
F.2d 472, 479 (3d Cir. 1939) (same), modified on other grounds, 311 U.S. 7 (1940),
with W.J. Ruscoe Co. v. NLRB, 406 F.2d 725, 726-27 (6th Cir. 1969) (misconduct
exceeding "reasonable limits" sufficient to justify refusal to reinstate), and Oneita
Knitting Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 375 F.2d 385, 391-93 (4th Cir. 1967) (criminal and
dangerous activities sufficient to justify refusal to reinstate) and Standard Lime &
Stone Co. v. NLRB, 97 F.2d 531, 533-34 (4th Cir. 1938) (dynamiting company
property sufficient to bar reinstatement). By permitting reinstatement in cases of
minor picket-line violence, the courts recognize that picket lines and prolonged
strikes are often emotionally-charged situations. Republic Steel Corp. -. NLRB, 107
F.2d 472, 479 (3d Cir. 1939), modified on other grounds, 311 U.S. 7 (1940); see
NLRB v. Thayer Co., 213 F.2d 748, 756-57 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 883
(1954); Note, Strike Misconduct: An Illusory Bar To Reinstatement, 72 Yale L.J. 182,
185 (1962).
124. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976). Awards of backpay are not limited to lost earnings
of employees who were reinstated following an unlawful discharge. Backpay, in the
form of earnings for lost employment opportunities, has been imposed against unions
whose hiring hall referrals discriminated against nonmember applicants in favor of
union members. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Ironwork-
ers, Local 373, 232 N.L.R.B. 504, 506 (1977), enforced, 108 L.R.R.M. 2278 (3d Cir.
1981); Local 675, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Vorkers, 223 N.L.R.B. 1499, 1499-1500 (1976),
enforced, 82 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 10,147 (3d Cir. 1977).
125. Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 27 (1952); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB,
313 U.S. 177, 197 (1941).
126. E.g., Union Nacional de Trabajadores (Catalytic Indus. Maintenance Co.),
219 N.L.R.B. 414, 414 (1975), enforced, 540 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1039 (1977); Union de Tronquistas, Local 901 (Lock Joint Pipe & Co.), 202
N.L.R.B. 399, 399-400 (1973); International Union of Operating Engrs, Local 513,
145 N.L.R.B. 554, 555 (1963); Local 983, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 115
N.L.R.B. 1123, 1123 (1956).
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when the union (1) caused the unlawful discharge of an employee;12 7
(2) refused to process an employee's grievance with respect to his
discharge;1 2 or (3) otherwise breached its duty of fair representa-
tion.12 9 One of the Board's rationales for refusing to apply this rem-
edy in strike violence cases is that other adequate Board remedies exist
that would not interfere with the right to strike,1 30 such as a section
10(j) injunction or the withholding of a bargaining order. 131  As
discussed, however, these remedies are infrequently used. 32  More
importantly, they in no way compensate the employees.
Another reason advanced by the NLRB for not granting this remedy
is that if all unions were required to provide backpay awards for all
intimidated employees when only a few union members engaged in
misconduct, few unions could afford to set up a picket line. 33 This
argument, however, ignores the Board's duty to formulate remedies
aimed at undoing the effects of the unfair labor practices committed.
That the argument is specious is amply illustrated by the fact that the
union can be found liable to employees in state court where not only
backpay, but full compensatory and punitive damages are avail-
able. 134
A third reason given by the NLRB is that an order of backpay in
these circumstances would be punitive, not remedial, and would
therefore exceed the Board's statutory authority.135 Awarding back-
pay to employees who lost wages due to strike violence, however, is
remedial, not punitive, because it is directly related to remedying the
127. E.g., Union Boiler Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 719, 719 n.3 (1979); Guadalupe
Carrot Packers, 228 N.L.R.B. 369, 369-70 (1977); Rossini, 228 N.L.R.B. 308, 311-12
(1977).
128. E.g., Groves-Granite, 232 N.L.R.B. 381, 381-82 (1977); Service Employees
Int'l Union, Local No. 579, 229 N.L.R.B. 692, 696 (1977).
129. E.g., Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union, 246 N.L.R.B. 747,
748 (1979), enforced per curiam, 662 F.2d 1044 (4th Cir. 1981); Massachusetts
Laborers' Dist. Council, 230 N.L.R.B. 640, 640-41, 644 (1977).
130. Union Nacional de Trabajadores (Catalytic Indus. Maintenance Co.), 219
N.L.R.B. 414, 414 (1975), enforced, 540 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1039 (1977); Union de Tronquistas, Local 901 (Lock Joint Pipe & Co.), 202
N.L.R.B. 399, 399 (1973); International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 513, 145
N.L.R.B. 554, 555-56 (1963).
131. Union de Tronquistas, Local 901 (Lock Joint Pipe & Co.), 202 N.L.R.B. 399,
399-400 (1973); see Union Nacional de Trabajadores (Catalytic Indus. Maintenance
Co.), 219 N.L.R.B. 414, 414 (1975), enforced, 540 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
132. See supra pts. I(A)(2)-(3).
133. Union de Tronquistas, Local 901 (Lock Joint Pipe & Co.), 202 N.L.R.B. 399,
400 (1973).
134. See infra pt. II(A).
135. Union Nacional de Trabajadores (Catalytic Indus. Maintenance Co.), 219
N.L.R.B. 414, 414 (1975), enforced, 540 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1039 (1977).
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effects of the unfair labor practice. 3  This was recognized by Chair-
man Miller and NLRB Member Kennedy in Union de Tronquistas,
Local 901 (Lock Joint Pipe & Co.), 137 and by Member Kennedy in
Union Nacional de Trabajadores (Catalytic Industrial Maintenance
Co.), 138 cases involving extensive violence and flagrant disregard for
the law. 139 Member Kennedy vehemently dissented from the Board's
decision in Catalytic not to award backpay, stating that "[i]t is diffi-
cult to conceive of a situation in which backpay orders could be more
appropriate."140  Simply because the NLRB has never previously ap-
plied this remedy does not preclude its application;' 14 the remedy is
clearly within the NLRB's authority.142
Some commentators even argue that the Board has the power to
award full compensatory damages. 143 They contend that by compen-
sating for injuries resulting from unfair labor practices, the Board
would be acting within its statutory grant under section 10(c) to
exercise broad discretion in formulating remedies to restore the parties
to the status that existed prior to the unlawful conduct.'44 The
Board's expertise, however, does not extend to assessing damages for
medical expenses and pain and suffering.' 45  Furthermore, the as-
sumption of this task would burden the NLRB with what are primar-
ily non-labor matters.
Two Supreme Court decisions acknowledging state court power to
award damages have noted the Board's lack of power to award full
compensatory damages. 46 In United Construction Workers v. La-
136. Union de Tronquistas, Local 901 (Lock Joint Pipe & Co.), 202 N.L.R.B. 399,
400 (1973) (Chairman Miller and Member Kennedy, dissenting in part), see Union
Nacional de Trabajadores (Catalytic Indus. Maintenance Co.), 219 N.L.R.B. 414,
417 (1975) (Member Kennedy, dissenting in part), enforced, 540 F.2d 1 (Ist Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
137. 202 N.L.R.B. 399, 400 (1973) (Chairman Miller and Member Kennedy,
dissenting in part).
138. 219 N.L.R.B. 414, 417 (1975) (Member Kennedy, dissenting in part), en-
forced, 540 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
139. Union Nacional de Trabajadores (Catalytic Indus. Maintenance Co.), 219
N.L.R.B. 414, 418-20 (1975) (Member Kennedy, dissenting in part), enforced, 540
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); Union de Tronquistas,
Local 901 (Lock Joint Pipe & Co.), 202 N.L.R.B. 399, 403-06 (1973).
140. 219 N.L.R.B. at 420 (Member Kennedy, dissenting in part), enforced, 540
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
141. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
143. Note, NLRB Remedies-Moving Into The let Age, 27 Baylor L. Rev. 292,
295-97 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Jet Age]; NLRB Power, supra note 70, at 1671.
144. Jet Age, supra note 143, at 296-97, NLRB Power, supra note 70, at 1683-84.
145. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 513, 145 N.L.R.B. 554, 556
(1963); International Hod Carriers, 145 N.L.R.B. 565, 565 (1963); see Union Na-
cional de Trabajadores (Catalytic Indus. Maintenance Co.), 219 N.L.R.B. 414, 414
(1975), enforced, 540 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
146. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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burnum Construction Corp., 147 the union threatened and intimidated
the employer and his nonunion employees with violence, causing the
employer to abandon several construction projects.148 In holding that
state tort actions for compensatory and punitive damages are not
preempted by the NLRA, the Court stated that the "Act sets up no
general compensatory procedure except in such minor supplementary
ways as the reinstatement of wrongfully discharged employees with
backpay."'' 49 In UAW v. Russell, 50 a nonunion employee sought
compensatory and punitive damages from the union in state court for
loss of earnings and mental anguish caused by the union's violence. ' 5'
In permitting the state tort claim, the Court declared that "Congress
did not establish a general scheme authorizing the Board to award full
compensatory damages for injuries caused by wrongful conduct. '' 52
Because the NLRB lacks the power to award full compensatory dam-
ages and has even refused to award backpay in strike violence cases,
victims of strike violence must resort to the courts.
II. STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
A. Compensatory and Punitive Damages
The Garmon rule 15 3 does not preempt state courts from awarding
both compensatory and punitive damages for violent tortious conduct
even though that conduct is prohibited by the NLRA and thus falls
within the NLRB's jurisdiction. 54 The Supreme Court has based its
justification for this exception on the Board's inability to provide
adequate relief for victims of violence 55 and on the overriding interest
of the state in maintaining public order. 56
When jurisdictional requirements such as diversity are met, federal
courts may also be an appropriate forum for labor-related tort
claims.15 7  Federal diversity jurisdiction in strike violence cases is,
however, unlikely' 8 because a union is considered to be a citizen of
147. 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
148. Id. at 657-58.
149. Id. at 665.
150. 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
151. Id. at 636-37.
152. Id. at 643.
153. See supra notes 18-20, 33-36 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
155. United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp. 347 U.S. 656, 663-66
(1954); see UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 640-45 (1958).
156. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959); UAW
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266, 272 (1956); Cox, Recent
Developments In Federal Labor Law Preemption, 41 Ohio St. L.J. 277, 281 (1980).
157. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976).
158. Note, Tort Liability of Labor Unions for Picket Line Assaults, 10 U. Mich.
J.L. Ref. 517, 519 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Tort Liability].
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the state in which each of its members reside.'15 When a state tort
claim arises out of the same nucleus of operative facts as a federal
claim under section 303 of the Act for damages incurred as a result of
an unlawful secondary boycott, federal courts may exercise pendent
jurisdiction. 60 The exercise of pendent jurisdiction, however, is dis-
cretionary,"" leaving the possibility that a federal court may choose
not to adjudicate a party's state claim. Another limitation on adjudi-
cating state tort claims in federal court is that parties must, as re-
quired by section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, present "clear proof
of actual participation" in unlawful acts by the union.""-
Civil damages have also been awarded under section 1985 of the Ku
Klux Klan Act 6 3 when union violence has occurred in the course of a
conspiracy to discriminate against nonunion employees.1" In Scott v.
Moore, 65 the Fifth Circuit applied section 1985(3) to allow redress to
a nonunion employer and his employees 6 who were violently at-
tacked by a group of union supporters seeking to force the nonunion
employees out of the area.167 In satisfying the five elements of a cause
of action under section 1985(3),16 s the nonunion employees were
159. United Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 147-50 (1965);
Lee v. Navarro Sav. Ass'n, 597 F.2d 421, 428 (5th Cir. 1979) (Vance, J., dissenting),
aff'd, 446 U.S. 458 (1980); Cochrane v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 596 F.2d 2.54,
263 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979): Tort Liability, supra note 158, at
519.
160. UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 728-29 (1966): Ritchie v. UMW, 410 F.2d
827, 831-32 (6th Cir. 1969); Tort Liability. supra note 158, at 519.
161. UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); Fields v. Fidelity General Ins.
Co., 454 F.2d 682, 686 (7th Cir. 1971); Lomax v. Armstrong Cork Co., 433 F.2d
1277, 1281 (5th Cir. 1970).
162. 29 U.S.C. § 106 (1976); e.g.. UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 736-37 (1966);
Ritchie v. UMW, 410 F.2d 827, 832-34 (6th Cir. 1969): Riverside Coal Co. v. UMV,
410 F.2d 267, 270-72 (6th Cir.), cert. denied. 396 U.S. 846 (1969).
163. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1976).
164. Scott v. Moore, 640 F.2d 708, 717-18, reh'g en banc granted, 656 F.2d 108
(5th Cir. 1981).
165. 640 F.2d 708, reh'g en banc granted, 656 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1981).
166. Id. at 724.
167. Id. at 711-12.
168. Four elements were set forth in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971):
"that the defendants did (1) 'conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the
premises of another' (2) 'for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly,
any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws' . . . that one or more of the conspirators
(3) did, or caused to be done, 'any act in furtherance of the object of [the] conspir-
acy,' whereby another was (4a) 'injured in his person or property' or (4b) 'deprived of
having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.' -" Id. at
102-03. A fifth element was added in McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co.,
545 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1977), namely, that the conspirators' conduct must be unlaw-
ful independent of the § 1985(3) violation. Id. at 925.
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found to be a protected class entitled to freedom of association.'10
The court concluded that the statute was not restricted to victims of
racial discrimination 170 and was thus applicable to the nonunion em-
ployees who were denied equal protection simply because they did not
belong to a labor union.1
7
'
Of the three forums in which damages may be awarded, the state
courts appear to be best suited for compensating parties injured by
strike violence. States have an overriding interest in maintaining pub-
lic order.17 2  Furthermore, state courts have expertise in assessing
damages for medical expenses and pain and suffering.173  Federal
causes of action are limited by diversity requirements, the discretion-
ary nature of the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, a higher burden of
proof and statutory requirements. The NLRB is likewise limited.
Although granting backpay falls within the scope of the NLRB's reme-
dial power, awarding full compensatory and punitive damages does
not. Because of these limitations, victims of strike violence are best
advised to seek relief in state court.
B. Injunctions
A state is not limited to redressing injuries resulting from strike
violence, but may seek to prevent such injuries from occurring. States
may exercise their police power through the issuance of injunctions
against the violence.174 In a picket line situation, the injunction must
be directed at curbing the violence, not the picketing, so as not to
infringe on the free speech rights of picketers. 75  When serious vio-
lence and picketing are inextricably intertwined, however, a state
may ban all picketing because "fear generated by past violence would
survive even though future picketing might be wholly peaceful." 70
169. 640 F.2d at 723.
170. Id. at 719-20.
171. Id. at 723-24.
172. See sources cited supra note 156.
173. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 513, 145 N.L.R.B. 554, 556
(1963); see Union Nacional de Trabajadores (Catalytic Indus. Maintenance Co.), 219
N.L.R.B. 414, 414 (1975), enforced, 540 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1039 (1977).
174. Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131, 138-39 (1957); UAW v. Wiscon-
sin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266, 272-73 (1956); Allen-Bradley Local
No. 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740, 748-49 (1942); Milk
Wagon Drivers Union, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 297-
98 (1941).
175. Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131, 139-40 (1957); see Milk Wagon
Drivers Union, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 298 (1941);
Comment, Picketing and the Expanding Role of the State Labor Injunction, 11 Tex.
Tech L. Rev. 779, 786 (1980).
176. Milk Wagon Drivers Union, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312
U.S. 287, 294 (1941); accord Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393
U.S. 175, 180 (1968); UM4W v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 731-32 (1966).
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Federal injunctions are more difficult to obtain than state injunc-
tions because the Norris-LaGuardia Act stripped federal courts of
most of their power to issue labor injunctions.177 The use of injunc-
tive relief against legitimate labor union activities is prohibited.'7 8
Section 7(a) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, however, permits the issu-
ance of an injunction against "unlawful acts [that] have been threat-
ened and will be committed unless restrained." '71 This section has
been interpreted to permit federal courts to enjoin violence, breaches
of the peace or criminal acts although such conduct was committed by
persons participating in an otherwise legitimate labor dispute. 80
Although federal courts thus have jurisdiction to enjoin violence,
sections 6 through 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act pose strict proce-
dural requirements. Section 6 rejects ordinary tests of agency liability
and sets a higher standard of proof: Union involvement must be
demonstrated by "clear proof of actual participation."',' The stand-
ards set forth in section 7 are: (1) that unlawful conduct has been
threatened and will ensue unless restrained; (2) that irreparable harm
will occur in the absence of an injunction; (3) that the plaintiff's harm
will be greater in the absence of an injunction than the defendant's
harm in the presence of an injunction; (4) that there is no adequate
remedy at law; and (5) that the public officers whose duty it is to
protect the plaintiff's property cannot or will not furnish adequate
protection.182 Section 8 provides further obstacles. No injunction ,vill
be issued if the plaintiff fails to comply with any obligation imposed
by law that is relevant to the labor dispute, or if the plaintiff fails to
make every reasonable effort to settle the dispute through negotiation,
mediation or arbitration.1 8 3 Taken together, these strict requirements
make it extremely difficult for a party to obtain an injunction from a
federal court. 8 4 Even though section 10(h) of the NLRA excepts
177. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976); see supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
178. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1976); Scott v. Moore, 640 F.2d 708, 714, reh'g en banc
granted, 656 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1981).
179. 29 U.S.C. § 107(a) (1976).
180. Scott v. Moore, 640 F.2d 708, 714, reh'g en bane granted, 656 F.2d 108 (5th
Cir. 1981); Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. v. Dukakis, 412 F. Supp. 580, 583-84 (D.
Mass. 1976); see Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Washington Chapter of the Congress of
Racial Equality, 209 F. Supp. 559, 560 (D.D.C. 1962).
181. 29 U.S.C. § 106 (1976).
182. Id. § 107.
183. Id. § 108.
184. W. Connolly & M. Connolly, supra note 83, at 173-76; see, e.g., Cimarron
Coal Corp. v. District No. 23, UMW, 416 F.2d 844, 845-47 (6th Cir. 1969) (injunc-
tion vacated), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); Donnelly Garment Co. v. Du-
binsky, 154 F.2d 38, 40-42 (8th Cir. 1946) (denial of injunction affirmed); Carter v.
Herrin Motor Freight Lines, 131 F.2d 557, 560-61 (5th Cir. 1942) (injunctive decree
reversed).
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Board injunctions from these requirements, 185 the Board has restricted
its use of section 10(j) injunctions.1 86 Thus, because of these limita-
tions and the state's concern in maintaining public order, 8 7 a party
seeking injunctive relief against labor violence is most likely to be
successful in a state court.
C. Criminal Laws
The inability of the NLRB to punish those who engage in strike
violence 88 leaves the task to state and federal courts. When a state
criminal statute is violated in the course of a labor dispute, the viola-
tor will not be shielded from state prosecution. 89 In addition, several
federal criminal statutes have been applied to situations involving
strike violence. 90 The existence of these criminal statutes therefore
acts as a deterrent to the commission of violence.' 91 One such statute
is the Hobbs Act,19 2 which was designed to prevent the use of violence
to extort higher wages and other benefits from employers. 9 3  Its
reach, however, was limited by United States v. Enmons,94 in which
the Supreme Court held that individuals who engage in minor picket
line violence during the course of a labor dispute are not subject to
prosecution under the Act.' 95 The proposed amendments'9 0 to the
Hobbs Act currently under consideration by the Senate would have
the effect of overturning Enmons by extending thb application of the
185. 29 U.S.C. § 160(h) (1976).
186. See supra pt. I(A)(2).
187. See sources cited supra note 156.
188. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
189. People v. LoPresto, 9 Mich. App. 318, 332, 156 N.W.2d 586, 594 (1967);
Newsday, Inc. v. Feldman, 8 A.D.2d 978, 978-79, 191 N.Y.S.2d 10, 12-13, motion
for leave to appeal denied, 9 A.D.2d 629, 191 N.Y.S.2d 547 (1959); see Russell v.
UAW, 258 Ala. 615, 620, 64 So. 2d 384, 388 (1953), afJ'd, 264 Ala. 456, 88 So. 2d
175 (1956), aff'd, 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
190. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
191. W. LaFave & A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law § 2, at 9, § 5, at 21
(1972); Senate Hearings on Hobbs Act Amendment, 108 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 294,
296-97 (Dec. 21, 1981) (statements of J.W. Supica before Senate Judiciary Subcom-
mittee on Criminal Law) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]; see Driver v. Hin-
nant, 356 F.2d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 1966); United States v. Barner, 195 F. Supp. 103,
105 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
192. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976).
193. United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 403 (1973).
194. 410 U.S. 396 (1973).
195. Id. at 404-06.
196. S. 613, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
197. Senate Hearings, supra note 191, at 295 (statements of Jonathan C. Rose,
Assistant Attorney General, before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Criminal
Law).
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Hobbs Act to any extortive violence that occurs during the course of a
legitimate labor dispute.1 97
Because of the current limitations on the Hobbs Act, the Ninth
Circuit, in United States v. Thordarson,9 8 applied other federal crim-
inal statutes 9 9 to strike violence. The court rejected the contentions
that the federal courts would become involved in policing routine
strike activity20 0 and transform minor violence into federal crimes.20
The court also rejected the argument that labor violence was ex-
empted from federal prosecution by the comprehensive regulation of
labor unions set forth by the NLRA.202  While the approach of the
Thordarson court is by no means settled law, its position seems appro-
priate in light of the Board's inability to punish and the Board's
ineffectiveness in deterring strike violence.
CONCLUSION
The overriding purpose of labor-management relations is the pro-
motion of industrial peace. Strike violence stands as an impediment to
the achievement of that goal. The National Labor Relations Board,
because of its special competence in labor relations and its broad
remedial power, is particularly well-suited to promote industrial
peace and undo the effects of strike violence. The Board, however, has
unjustifiably restricted its use of its most powerful remedies by relying
primarily on cease and desist orders. Because of the NLRB's failure to
employ its broad remedial power to control violence, the burden has
fallen on state and federal courts, which lack the Board's expertise in
labor matters.
When strike violence is flagrant and severely restrains and coerces
employees in the exercise of their statutory rights, the Board should
not refrain from employing its more extraordinary remedies- decerti-
198. 646 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 601 (1981).
199. The court applied the Interstate and Foreign Travel or Transportation in Aid
of Racketeering Enterprise Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1976), the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976), and 18
U.S.C. § 844 (1976), against the union in reversing the dismissal of the criminal
indictments. 646 F.2d at 1327-31.
200. 646 F.2d at 1329.
201. Id. The acts of violence present in Thordarson included the use of explosives
to destroy vehicles used in interstate commerce. Id. The Thordarson court distin-
guished United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396 (1973), stating that arson was not the
type of minor picket-line violence the Enmons Court feared would become federal
crimes under the Hobbs Act. Id.
202. Id. at 1330-31. The court stated that the NLRB does not have exclusive
jurisdiction to deal with union misconduct and violence, and that federal criminal
statutes could properly be applied. Id.
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fication, section 10(j) injunctions and the denial of bargaining orders.
The Board should also play a greater role in compensating individuals
by awarding backpay to employees coerced by violence into joining a
strike. Greater use of the NLRB's most powerful remedies will more
effectively compensate injured parties, deter strike violence and pro-
mote industrial peace.
Donald R. Gitto
